foreign trade and foreign investment. Section 3 will offer theoretical considerations about how a poor country, and in particular its labor force, might be integrated into the world economy. Section 4 discusses emigration from China and India in recent years.
Section 5 then pulls together the empirical and theoretical material and offers some judgments about current and future integration of the two countries into the world economy. Table 1 already declining from year to year, and is expected to decline at an annual rate of 3 percent in the period 2020-2025. That age group in India continues to grow in the near future, but reaches a peak in 2020 and in the subsequent five years will also be declining, albeit at a much more modest 0.1 percent a year.
Population and Employment
In short, the potential labor force has grown more rapidly than the population in both countries, producing the so-called "demographic dividend" as birth rates decline and young adults increase more rapidly than dependent children -and before dependent elders become quantitatively significant. This process has about run its course in China, but will continue on a moderate scale in India for some decades, resulting (on this account) in some slowdown in China's future growth, but permitting somewhat faster growth in India.
Of course, translating the demographic dividend into actual growth depends also on labor force participation rates, and on actually employing potential workers productively. There is a significant difference between China and India on participation rates. Fifty-seven percent of China's population was employed in 2000, compared with 37 percent in India. [CSA; India from Ghose, p.5107] . Part of the difference can be explained by the difference in age structure, with 68 percent of China's population being between 15 and 64 in 2000, compared with 63 percent in India in 2001. In addition, however, participation rates among women was far lower in India. This may be explained in part by the higher rural and agricultural population in India, where women in fact work hard at home but are not considered employed in the conventional sense. There is also a stonger tradition, encouraged by the Communist Party, for women to enter the labor force in China, whereas in India some religious groups actively discourage it.
There is also the Hindu tradition that Brahmins, as priests, do not work; this tradition is breached in urban areas, but not in all rural areas.
Even if persons are in the labor force (i.e. they are working or looking for work), they may not be employed productively. Official figures on unemployment has been low in both countries -on the order of three percent of the urban labor force. But these low figures certainly understate the involuntary idleness among workers in both countries.
Hu Angang (2005, p.233) reckons that real urban unemployment in China was nearly thrice the official figure in 2000: 17 million rather than the official six million. The official figure had risen to 8.3 million by 2004, 4.2 percent of the urban labor force (China Statistical Abstract, p.47) . In India the official unemployment rate was 2.8 percent in 2000 [calculated from Ghose, pp. 5107, 09] , but Ghose (2004) explains why the very concept of "unemployment" is not very meaningful in a country like India, where most of the labor force is in the informal or unorganized sectors of the economy, and work available to individual workers may be highly sporadic, averaging only a few days a month. Such people are not unemployed on conventional definitions, but they are not fully or productively employed either. Thus, argues Ghose, true underemployment in India (against a baseline assumption of six days a week of work) is on the order of 13 percent of all employed persons (Ghose, Table 8 ), more than four times the official rate.
China has moved people out of agriculture considerably more rapidly than India.
While the two countries were similar in the share of agricultural employment in 1980, at 5 69 percent of total employment, by 2001 China had created many more non-agricultural jobs in rural areas; 33 percent of rural employment was non-farm and half of the income in rural areas was generated by non-agricultural activity (Li Xiaoxi, pp.101, 104) . In 2000 India, 59 percent of employment was in agriculture. [Ghose, p. 5109] . By 2000
China's agricultural employment had fallen to 50 percent of the labor force, and to 46 percent in 2004. In 2000 industry (including construction) accounted for 16 percent of India's employment (manufacturing for 11 percent), up from 14 percent in 1981, compared with 22 percent in China, up from 18 percent in 1980. In short, both countries increased industrial employment as a share of total employment, implying significantly more jobs considering the growth in total labor force, but the increase in share, while larger for China, was modest in both countries.
The "organized" sector in India, to which labor market laws and regulations apply, in principle covers all organizations that employ more than ten persons. But it accounts for a remarkably small share -nine percent [in 1996, calculated from SY]--of total employment; and more than two-thirds of the organized sector is government or quasi-governmental organizations. Regular wage and salary workers -those with regular employment paying a regular wage -accounted for about 40 percent of employment in urban areas in 1999/00 (Sundaram and Tenduklar, Table 12 ). Table 2 ).
Trends in manufacturing employmennt have also been very different in the two countries. Due to severe labor regulations applying to firms of over ten employees, private manufacturing employment in India's "organized" (i.e. closely regulated) sector is astonishingly low and actually declined slightly over the period 1981 to 1991, to 4.5 million (another 1.9 million were employed in state-owned manufacturing enterprises) [YS, p.99 ]. This figure rose by a modest 2.9 percent a year over the 1990s, but remained under six million, compared with a 9.0 percent annual growth in output (Banga, Table 3 ).
According to India's 1991 census, a total of 28.7 million persons worked in "industry" in that year, organized and unorganized, including the more than 800 manufacturing activities that were reserved to the household sector (which accounted for 6.8 million persons) [YS, p.88] . This was up modestly from the 25.1 million so engaged in 1981.
By 2000 the total had grown to perhaps 40 million (calculated from data in Ghose). Besley and Burgess (2004) have examined employment in 16 Indian states over the period . They find that those states that passed pro-worker legislation (within the framework established by Union legislation in 1947) experienced lower growth in manufacturing output, lower growth in employment in registered manufacturing firms, and increases in urban poverty compared with those states that passed pro-employer legislation or none at all, suggesting that over-regulation of the labor market goes some way toward explaining the small size of the private organized sector.
In 1980 China had 77.1 million persons in the "secondary sector," which covers manufacturing but also mining, utilities, and construction. This rose steadily to 166 million in 1998, then declined for four years before increasing again to 169 million in 2004, but almost all the recent increase has been in construction [CSA, pp.45, 140] . China's industrial labor market was highly regimented in 1980, with both wages and employment of individuals being determined by the state. These regulations were gradually relaxed and in 1995 a labor contract system was introduced, such that by 2001 72 percent of SOEs determined their wages, and 81 percent of non-SOE enterprises (Li Xiaoxi, p. 103) . Enterprises are "entitled to employ or lay-off labor on the basis of the labor contract and in accordance with the market conditions and the performance of the enterprise" (Li Xiaoxi, p.109) . By 2005 it could fairly be said that China's urban labor market was largely free, subject only to some remaining restrictions on internal migration within China, restrictions that were routinely violated, and are in the process of being formally relaxed.
Internal migration in China seems to be more substantial than it is in India. Li Most of the inter-state migration in India is male, and largely between the ages of 15 and 44. Rural women often migrate, but typically through marriage to men in neighboring villages. Tripathy and Dash (1997) , on the basis of interviews of over 500 families in eight Orissa villages in 1993-94, report that most male migration is to towns or cities in other states. They find that migration widens knowledge, experience, and tolerance, and opens people to new ideas. Families with migrants are notably better off than those without, more able to pay off their debts to money-lenders, the bane of landless workers constantly in hock; buy more food and better clothes; build better houses; and buy more or better agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, and pumps.
Migration also lowers the birth rate (since males are away for long periods) and introduces new attitudes and new ideas. Remittances are very important to the families of migrants, and improves rural well-being.
Broadly similar findings for internal migrants result from a survey of over 400 village households in southern China [Zhang et al., 2003, cited China undertook a major expansion of university-level education during the past decade (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , increasing the number of institutions by two-thirds to 1731, more than doubling the number of faculty to 858,000, more than quintupling the number of students to 13.3 million, and quadrupling the number of graduating students to 2.5 million, including 151,000 graduate degrees [CSA, . Relative to GDP, China's FDI has been around five percent, India's barely approaching one percent in the past few years. In addition to formal restrictions on foreign ownership, India maintains numerous non-discriminatory barriers to private business. In international comparison, the procedures to start a business are complex, and the time and cost involved are high; it is extremely difficult, and costly, to fire workers; the time and cost of enforcing contracts are high; and closing a business on average takes ten years, with an exceptionally low financial recovery rate (Dahlman/Utz, appendix 8).
Both countries have experienced foreign purchases of equity -not involving management -in roughly equal measure in recent years: net inflows into India of $31 billion over the period 1996-2004, compared with $37 billion into China. [GDF, p.146] .
Care must be taken in interpreting these figures. It has been said that as much as one-third of the inward FDI into China is actually resident capital, run through a foreign shell (often based in Hong Kong, a separate economic entity, or in the British Virgin 
Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations
It is useful to distinguish among three concepts of a country's economic relations to the rest of the world, or to other countries: engagement, integration, and influence.
"Engagement" occurs whenever a country's factors of production (e.g. labor) produce for sale in another country, either through migration to that country or through exports.
"Integration" occurs when product or factor markets are so closely linked that prices move together. Complete integration is rare, being approximated most closely by some commodity markets and by short-term financial markets in rich countries. But a key indicator of integration is how closely prices move together. It is noteworthy that in principle integration can be high even with low levels of international transactions, so long as markets are open and linked, e.g. the price of domestically produced oil is determined by world oil prices. Thus we may want to say that factors are "engaged" in the world economy even if their production is sold into the domestic market, so long as the relevant market is integrated into the world market. That is a question of semantic taste.
Markets may not be integrated and labor and capital may not be engaged and still there could be a significant international "influence" on the domestic economy, e.g. through foreign assistance, or through inward transfer of technology, or through changes in the terms of trade. Thus the rise in world oil prices in the 1970s influenced both India (an oil importer) and China (an oil exporter) by affecting their budget constraints even though domestic prices were insulated from world price changes. The green revolution was made possible in India by importing technology, even though domestic food prices were insulated from world price developments.
Economic integration implies that when economic agents try to improve their economic well-being by responding to incentives for higher income, they succeed, even when the opportunities are in different sectors or in different geographic areas. Global integration occurs when such success spans many different countries. An important part of this process is the movement of workers, especially from rural to urban areas within countries, or from poor to rich countries internationally, or at least to where better economic opportunities exist. International migration will be discussed in the next section. Suffice it to say here that there are major policy obstacles to international migration -few countries welcome non-homogeneous immigrants -as well as the usual human obstacles of cost, risk, language, and cultural alienation.
Up to a point, international trade can be a functional substitute for migration, while avoiding some of the costs. Workers can make products in excess of domestic needs and sell them abroad, thereby earning a better livelihood at home. Economists have an elegant theory of comparative advantage based on relative factor endowmentsconjectured by the Swedish economic historian, Eli Heckscher, developed further by his student Bertil Ohlin, and formalized by Paul Samuelson -now known as H-O or HOS theory. The key point is that under free trade countries will specialize in products that use intensively factors that they have in relative abundance. This is obvious in the case of natural resources or agriculturally productive land, which are not evenly distributed among countries, but it also applies to labor and capital. For example, countries with a relative abundance of unskilled labor (compared with land, capital, and skilled labor) will export products which require a relatively high amount of unskilled labor in their production, e.g. apparel. When certain demanding conditions are met, such specialization can even result in equalization of factor prices across countries, through trade alone, without migration. This remarkable result has fascinated economists ever since Samuelson first propounded the theorem in 1948; but the conditions for equalization are extremely severe (including competitive product and factor markets, homogeneous factors of production, a menu of identical technologies available to all countries, unique factor-intensity in production of each product, and the relevant countries producing a list of commodities in common that is large enough to cover all factors). They are not observed in practice.
Indeed, there is some question about the applicability of the HOS theory to a world of rapid but uneven technical change and factors that are not, and cannot be, homogeneous except in the very long run. Concretely, in the short-to medium-run both skilled labor and capital are specialized for the industries in which they work, resulting in a large number of specialized, not homogeneous, factors of production. Over the long run capital can be redeployed (as old capital depreciates) and labor can be retrained or replaced with new members of the labor force, trained differently; but over this same long run, measured sometimes in decades rather than years, the technology of production will also have changed significantly, and differentially by country, despite growing international diffusion of technology.
Nonetheless a weak version of the insight propounded originally by Heckscher may be thought to have some applicability, particularly where unskilled labor can be found in abundance, as in China and India. Thus we should see such countries exporting goods and services that require relatively high amounts of unskilled labor; and this specialization on the world scene would put downward pressure on unskilled labor markets in countries where unskilled labor was less abundant, reducing wages and/or employment of such labor, and should raise the wages of unskilled workers in countries where it is in relative abundance, compared with a situation in which trade is not allowed or is seriously inhibited. We discuss below the extent to which such phenomena can be observed.
Emigration
As noted above, international migration is one mechanism through which integration of factor markets might take place. Globally, migration has taken place on a Not all emigrants, however, are highly educated. Many moderately educated
Chinese from Fujian province were allegedly smuggled abroad, especially into the United States [Kwong] , and many low-educated Indians work in the oil-rich Gulf states, the former being illegal under US law, and the latter on temporary work permits.
There is a complex set of potential economic relations between an emigrating population and those that remain. Concerns expressed decades ago about a "brain drain" from developing to rich countries have not disappeared, but they have become much more nuanced in recent years, especially for China and India, where an extensive overseas diaspora is playing a significant and increasing role in their home countriesthrough remittances, returnees, venture capital, entrepreneurship, and marketing access abroad. In a world endowed only with workers and capital, emigrants drawn from the average population, taking their capital with them, under competitive conditions would leave those behind neither better nor worse off than before, except insofar as publicly financed education was paid for by borrowing from future income. Allowance for productive land, which cannot migrate, would leave those behind somewhat better off.
But such statements in practice need to be heavily qualified in a number of ways, especially if the migrants are educated better than average. On the other hand, the possibility of emigration may create an incentive for more people to become better educated than otherwise, even though many of the hopefuls do not actually emigrate. Bhalla (p.124 ) , arguing that these are the most poorly paid of Indian workers, also suggests a rise of about 3 percent a year 1983-1999. This growth in real wages is puzzling, given the increase in the man-land ratio as India's rural population and labor force increased, but that was apparently more than compensated by increased irrigation, technical improvements in agriculture, and increased use of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. There has been too little rural-to-urban migration in India to make much difference, although cases can be found (e.g. in Orissa) where land has gone idle because the workers have migrated and the land-owning brahmins cannot till their land both because of inadequate farming skills and because it would be beneath their priestly dignity.
In the urban "organized" sector wage determination is heavily influenced by the governments (which taken together account for two-thirds of organized employment), so these wages are not really determined by competitive market forces (Banga, 2/05 ). This marks a sharp contrast with China today, where wages and other conditions of employment are determined by enterprises, paying what is necessary to get the labor they need (see Li Xiaoxi, ch.3). It is ironic that both the European Union and the United States officially consider China a non-market economy, implying that in assessing antidumping duties surrogate economies are used to calculate costs, and the surrogate sometimes used is India! Given the structure of the Indian economy, labor regulations, trade policy, and religious practice (where in rural areas the occupation-determining caste system is very much alive), it is difficult to conclude that the Indian labor force, taken as a whole, is integrated into the world economy at all, or even well integrated across India. The exception is the much-publicized IT and business back office activities, where perhaps one million workers (according to the FT, 12/05) are employed in ways that plug them into the rest of the world, and where earnings are influenced by that connection. But this is a small and relatively well-educated portion of India's labor force. Moreover, although India produces many engineers annually, most are unsuitable for working abroad (as engineers) or in foreign firms in India; McKinsey (p.32), on the basis of surveys of human resource managers in dozens of firms, concluded that only about 25 percent of Indian graduate engineers would qualify (and only 10 percent of the Chinese graduates), and many of these would be inaccessible because of unwillingness to move near a major airport. Kapur/McHale (p.98) India seems to have done much better in the upscale, lower volume, higher mark-up market, from an industry still based on the skills of master tailors rather than mass production (Tewari) . Thus India may succeed in finding a special role in the world market for apparel.
Cutting in the other direction, however, are attempts by governments, state as well as union, to incorporate the IT sector increasingly into the "organized" sector, that is, to subject it to heavy labor market regulation by closing the loopholes that have permitted it to function more flexibly to date. But there is a problem with interpretation of the dramatic increase in wages that has taken place in China. As we have seen, China's employment in manufacturing has fallen, not risen, despite a sharp increase in exports of manufactured goods. Wage increases reflect not merely integration into the world economy -manifested in increased exports, especially from foreign enterprieses or joint ventures -but also a significant restructuring of the economy, including the entire manufacturing sector. No doubt this restructuring was facilitated by the opening of China's economy, and especially by the growth in exports, but it differs from the process characterized by HOS theory, which assumes the demand for unskilled labor would have risen.
Furthermore, wage differentials for well-educated Chinese have risen, not fallen as strict HOS theory would require. Differential earnings for those with tertiary education over those with primary education rose from about 25 percent in 1988 to 75 percent in 1999; and differentials of high school graduates over primary school graduates rose from 12 percent to 35 percent over the same period of time (Hu, p.204) . Indeed, China is increasingly able to recruit back to China students that have been educated in US or European universities.
The high rate of investment in China has raised capital-labor ratios dramatically (from admittedly low levels two decades ago), by nearly 11 percent a year in 1995-2001. Labor productivity has risen correspondingly, by over seven percent a year over the period . But capital productivity has fallen since 1995, pulling down the growth in total factor productivity to less than half its 1978-1995 rate during the period 1995 -2001 . It no doubt fell further during the investment boom of 2003-2004. In conclusion, we can say that during the past two decades there has been increasing engagement by portions of China's labor force with the world economy, much less so in the case of India. Although it is much greater than twenty years ago, integration with the world economy remains highly incomplete, again especially for India, where it can be said it has hardly taken place at all, with the partial exceptions of the IT sector and parts of the automobile and apparel sectors. Nonetheless, the world economy has had an increasing influence on both countries, through introduction of foreign technologies, changes in terms of trade brought about by rising prices for raw materials (especially oil), and sensitivity of some sectors to changes in demand in the world economy. Finally, there seems to have been some convergence in real incomes, in that real wages of the least skilled members of the labor forces in both countries have risen more rapidly than the wages of low-skill workers in the United States and Europe; and skill differentials have widened, as elsewhere in the world, suggesting that wages of high-skill workers have also risen relative to those in the United States and Europe.
Conjectures about the Future
China still has much potential for moving unskilled workers out of agriculture into more productive economic activities, and has a demonstrated capacity to do it. Therefore China will continue to grow the service sector and the production and assembly of light manufactures, with an increasing ratio of domestic value added (thus reducing China's dependence on imported components). However, China is now the third largest exporting country in the world, exceeding Japan, and thus Chinese products will meet increasing market resistance compared with when China was smaller, for two quite different reasons: China's market share is now high in many products, and it will be more difficult to pry customers away from favored suppliers. Second, China will encounter increasing protectionist resistance from competitors determined to hold onto their markets, especially (now that China is entitled to non-discriminatory treatment under its WTO membership, except for transitional provisions against import surges from China that lapse in 2008) in the form of anti-dumping cases, the current and grossly misused favorite form of protection in the European Union, the United States, and indeed a growing number of countries. India already has the largest number of anti-dumping duties against Chinese firms.
As educational attainment rises in China, it will gradually increase production of more sophisticated products, just as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan did earlier. But the impact on the composition of China's trade will be limited, at least for some years, by the demands of China's military modernization for the higher skills, including production of military equipment, and especially by its abundance of unskilled labor, which will keep China's international comparative advantage in products that use the unskilled labor.
India is much less well positioned than China. Internal mobility, both geographic and occupational, is very much lower, and India has been much less successful in creating new non-agricultural jobs for unskilled labor in the tradable sectors. India no doubt will continue to excel at aspects of information technology and outsourced backoffice work, but even that will be limited by the availability of suitably skilled manpower.
Exports of manufactured goods will continue to develop further, particularly selected apparel, auto parts, and perhaps motorcycles, bicycles, and similar light manufactures, as well as some engineering goods. India's exports have a much higher ratio of domestic valued-added than do China's. But India will be subject to stiff competition from China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh in less sophisticated manufactured goods, and from eastern Europe (especially in European markets), Brazil, China, and perhaps Indonesia for more sophisticated products. India's belated adoption of special economic zones may increase both foreign direct investment and exports from India, but at this stage it is too early to tell both how "streamlined" the bureaucratic requirements will actually be and whether the required infrastructure improvements will be made.
Some of the most skilled Indians will continue to emigrate, at least temporarily, to rich countries -especially English-speaking countries, but also to Germany and the Netherlands. They will meet competition from Eastern Europeans, including Russians, where technical education is as good or better. Even after extensive liberalization (compared with India's starting point, but not compared with other important emerging markets), the Indian economy remains remarkably self-absorbed and inward oriented.
This inward orientation is undoubtedly changing, but the pace of change in the coming decade is still open to question. And if Indian exports do grow dramatically, following the lead of China 15 years ago, they too will encounter some protectionist resistance, India's management of its economy will come under greater scrutiny, and no doubt many allededly "unfair" practices will be found (e.g. electricity prices below cost).
Emigration from both China and India, particularly those who study abroad and then settle there, will undoubtedly continue to enrich the economies of the host countries, especially the United States, Britain, Australia, and Canada, which have a demonstrated capacity to absorb such immigrations, and their children, into mainstream society.
Increasing returnees will also enrich the home countries with their education and experience abroad, including their experience in business. The numbers are likely to remain small relative to national populations, but significant on certain margins, e.g. engineers in the United States.
A discussion of the future of manufacturing in the United States goes well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that public discussion of the issue has unhelpfully confused trends in manufacturing employment and manufacturing output.
Manufacturing is likely to proceed as agriculture did before it, with continued declines in employment (in absolute as well as relative terms) combined with continued increases in output, as productivity continues to rise at a faster rate than output and routine jobs are increasingly mechanized. US manufacturing employment reached its all-time peak in 1979 at 19 million workers; by 2005 manufacturing employment had fallen to 14 million (some of the decline due to reclassification of jobs that were outsourced by manufacturing firms to domestic service providers), while real manufacturing output had doubled. This long-term trend will continue, and is only marginally sensitive to imports from countries such as China and India. Table 5 (1990=100)
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